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Abstract
We released over 1 million tweets shared during 2019 and
containing links to thousands of news articles published on
two classes of Italian outlets: (1) disinformation websites,
i.e. outlets which have been repeatedly flagged by journal-
ists and fact-checkers for producing low-credibility content
such as false news, hoaxes, click-bait, misleading and hyper-
partisan stories; (2) fact-checking websites which notably de-
bunk and verify online news and claims. The dataset, which
includes also title and body for approximately 37k news ar-
ticles, is publicly available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/
PGVDHX.
Introduction
We are witnessing an ever growing concern over the pres-
ence and the influence of deceptive and malicious infor-
mation spreading on online social media (Pierri and Ceri
2019)(Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Researchers use differ-
ent terms to indicate the same issue, namely disinforma-
tion, misinformation, propaganda, junk news and click-bait.
In this work we use the word disinformation, rather than
the more popular ”fake news”, to refer to a variety of low-
credibility content which comprises false news intended to
harm, misleading and non-factual reporting, hyper-partisan
news and propaganda, and unverified rumors (Pierri, Pic-
cardi, and Ceri 2019).
Most of the research on this issue has focused on past
2016 US Presidential elections: it has been shown that false
news spread deeper and faster than reliable news, with social
bots and echo chambers playing a primary role in the dif-
fusion (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018)(Vosoughi, Roy, and
Aral 2018)(Shao et al. 2018a)(Shao et al. 2018b); however,
misleading information usually amounts to a negligible frac-
tion of overall online news, and it is mostly shared by old
and conservative leaning people, highly engaged with poli-
tics (Grinberg et al. 2019)(Bovet and Makse 2019).
Nevertheless, disinformation spreading on social plat-
forms has been also reported in European countries in differ-
ent circumstances, including 2016 Brexit (Bastos and Mer-
cea 2019), 2017 French Presidential Elections (Howard et
al. )(Ferrara 2017), 2017 Catalan referendum (Stella, Fer-
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rara, and De Domenico 2018), 2018 Italian General elec-
tions (Cantarella, Fraccaroli, and Volpe 2019) (Giglietto et
al. 2018) and 2019 European elections (Hedman, Sivnert,
and Howard 2018)(Kollanyi and Howard 2017)(Howard et
al. )(Marchal et al. 2019)(Pierri, Artoni, and Ceri 2019).
For what concerns Italy, where according to Reuters trust
in news is today particularly low (Nielsen et al. 2019), pre-
vious research has highlighted the existence of segregated
communities (Del Vicario et al. 2017) when it comes to con-
sume online news, and remarkable exposure to online disin-
formation was discovered in the run-up to 2018 Italian Gen-
eral elections (Giglietto et al. 2018), a result which was also
substantiated in a report of the Italian Authority for Commu-
nications Guarantees (AGCOM) (AGCOM 2018). Besides,
Facebook has recently shut down several pages and accounts
for violating platform’s terms of use, thanks to the insights
provided by Avaaz (Avaaz 2019), which revealed the exis-
tence of a network of agents spreading low-credibility and
inflammatory content about controversial themes such as
immigration, national safety and anti-establishment.
In the following we first describe previous research contri-
butions that relate to our work; next we provide a description
of the collection procedure and the dataset itself, which is
available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PGVDHX; finally
we briefly describe two applications of this dataset and we
conclude.
Related work
There are a few references in the literature which relate to
this work.
As the title of this paper suggests, we based our con-
tribution on Hoaxy platform (Shao et al. 2016)(Hui et al.
2018), which has been tracking–since 2016–the diffusion on
Twitter of hundreds of thousands of news articles published
on US disinformation and fact-checking websites, collect-
ing millions of tweets containing explicit links to these do-
mains. Authors provide an API to easily download their data
(available at https://rapidapi.com/truthy/api/hoaxy), and also
the source code for developing the collection pipeline (avail-
able at https://github.com/IUNetSci/hoaxy-backend), which
we implemented starting from our own list of Italian sources.
NELA-GT-2018 (Nørregaard, Horne, and Adalı 2019) is
a large political news data set which contains 700k articles
collected in 2018 from almost 200 US news outlets which
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Figure 1: Time series (in two halves) of the number of col-
lected tweets, on a daily basis, for disinformation (blue) and
fact-checking articles (orange).
include mainstream, hyper-partisan, and conspiracy sources.
Authors used 8 different assessment sites to assess veracity,
reliability, bias, transparency, adherence to journalistic stan-
dards, and consumer trust of these sources.
Authors in (Brena et al. 2019) built a pipeline for collect-
ing data describing news sharing behaviour on Twitter: they
take as input a list of news sources and collect articles shared
on Twitter, as well as metadata about users sharing such sto-
ries. They released an associated dataset concerning the US
landscape which contains approx. 1 million tweets and 300k
articles.
Authors in (Balestrucci et al. 2019) provide a dataset of
thousands of so-called credulous Twitter users, i.e. human-
operated accounts who exhibit a high percentage of bots
among their followings. These might be particularly ex-
posed to the harmful activities of social bots and they could
become spreaders of misleading information. Authors also
provide a supervised classifier to accurately recognize such
users with accuracy up to 93.27%.
Data collection
As previously mentioned, we referred to Hoaxy (Shao et
al. 2016) to setup our collection pipeline. We used Twitter
Streaming API (via tweepy Python package) from January
to December 2019 to filter tweets containing URLs of 66
Italian disinformation outlets1 and a few fact-checking agen-
1A complete list of these websites is available at https://docs.
google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YRNFXrr47w8pa1j3GmPnBjtIarf9
Domain Articles Tweets Users
Fact-checking 3,566 50,662 17,155
Disinformation 32,686 1,068,102 45,112
Table 1: Breakdown of the dataset in terms of articles, tweets
and users.
cies, namely PagellaPolitica2, Bufale.net3, Butac.it4 and
Lavoce.info5. We referred to the blacklists compiled by
these websites in order to build our list of untrustworthy
websites, i.e. outlets who notably publish hoaxes and false
news, but also conspiracy theories, hyper-partisan news,
clickbait and pseudoscience.
We used web domains as track parameter as described
in Twitter documentation6 to capture all related tweets, e.g.
”voxnews info OR ilprimatonazionale it OR ...”. We also
built our own crawler in Python to scrape news articles and
perform URL canonicalization.
We first remark that we can only release tweet IDs–which
can be used to retrieve original tweets via Twitter API using
the status/lookup Twitter endpoint–in accordance with
Twitter terms of use, whereas we provide title and body for
news articles which are publicly accessible. Secondly, we
are aware of the limitation of Twitter Streaming endpoint,
which cuts out matched tweets when they reach 1% of daily
volume of shared tweets (Morstatter et al. 2013); however,
we did not incur in missing data as we collected roughly ·105
tweets per day, which is far less than the 1% of current daily
volume of tweets7 that exceeds 2 · 108 shared tweets.
Data description
In Figure 1 we show the time series of collected tweets
on a daily basis, for both disinformation (black) and fact-
checking news (orange). We collected the data in two
phases: the first goes from January to mid-July, when we
experienced a pause in the collection; we then resumed it
at the beginning of September and ran it until December.
Blank spaces correspond to temporary network failures. A
breakdown of the dataset in terms of articles, tweets and
users is provided in Table 1. We can notice that the presence
of fact-checking stories is negligible compared to disinfor-
mation news–less than 5% of total tweets contain a link to
fact-checking stories which amount to less than 10% of total
shared articles–in line with findings in the US (Shao et al.
2016).
In Figure 2 we show the distribution of the number of
shared tweets for Top-10 disinformation sources (which ac-
count for over 99% of related tweets) and fact-checking
sources, whereas in Table 3 we show Top-10 disinformation
and fact-checking articles w.r.t the total number of shares.
xFAHPT0GN1 lDQ.
2www.pagellapolitica.it
3www.bufale.net
4www.butac.it
5www.lavoce.info
6https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs
7https://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/
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Figure 2: Distribution of the number of articles for a) disin-
formation and b) fact-checking sources.
We can notice that there are only a handful of highly
active outlets which are responsible for most of the mis-
leading information spreading on Twitter. In particular,
”voxnews.info” (and most other websites in the Top-10)
notably publish hoaxes and fake news8 which usually in-
volve immigrants, refugees and national safety; ”ilprima-
tonazionale.it” is the reference news outlet for Italian far-
right community (and official website of former party Casa
Pound), and it has often been compared to BreitbartNews
for its propaganda and hyper-partisan reporting; finally, ”by-
oblu.com” is rather involved with the Italian euro-skeptical
community and it regularly spreads conspiracy theories.
Applications
In the following we describe two applications of our dataset
referring to our previous works, namely (1) a detailed inves-
tigation of disinformation spreading on the Italian Twitter-
verse in the run-up to 2019 European Parliament elections
(Pierri, Artoni, and Ceri 2019), and (2) a classification of
mainstream and disinformation news based on multilayer
networks (Pierri, Piccardi, and Ceri 2020).
Disinformation in the run-up to 2019 European Par-
liament elections. We analyzed the 5-month period pre-
ceding the 2019 European Parliament elections (which took
place on the May, 26th) to investigate the presence and in-
fluence of disinformation in the Italian Twitterverse. The
8See for example the list of debunked articles at https://www.
open.online/?s=voxnews
a) Main K-core of the disinformation diffusion network
b) Network of hyperlinks between disinformation websites from
different countries
Figure 3: A visualization of a) the main K-core of the dis-
information diffusion network and b) the network of hyper-
links between outlets from different countries. Colors indi-
cate different groups according to a community detection al-
gorithm in a), and the country of provenance in b).
dataset analyzed corresponds to part of the collection we re-
lease in this paper.
We observed that most of the deceptive information was
shared by a few outlets, and a dictionary-based topic analysis
revealed that misleading news mostly focused on on contro-
versial and polarizing topics of debate such as immigration,
national safety and (Italian) nationalism.
We also analyzed the main K-core (Batagelj and Zaver-
snik 2003) of the diffusion network and noticed that the
spread of disinformation on Twitter was confined in a lim-
ited community, strongly (and explicitly) related to the Ital-
ian conservative and far-right political environment; a net-
work dismantling analysis showed that this could be easily
dismantled with several strategies based on node centrality
measures.
Finally, we searched hyperlinks contained in news arti-
cles and discovered connections between different disinfor-
mation outlets across Europe, U.S. and Russia, which often
featured similar, even translated, articles.
We show in Figure 3 the core of the global diffusion
RETWEET layer
QUOTE layer
MENTION layer
REPLY layer
Figure 4: An example of multi-layer diffusion network on
Twitter.
network (where colors indicate groups identified with a
community-detection algorithm) and the network of hy-
perlinks between websites (where colors indicate different
countries). We refer the interested reader to (Pierri, Artoni,
and Ceri 2019) for more details on the results.
Disinformation detection via multilayer diffusion net-
works. We developed a machine learning framework to
classify news articles published on disinformation vs main-
stream news outlets based on Twitter diffusion networks.
For each article we built a multi-layer diffusion network
(see Figure 4) based on different social interactions on Twit-
ter, namely tweets, retweets, mentions, replies and quotes.
We selected a set of global network properties, which quan-
tify different aspects of the sharing process, to encode
different networks with a tuple of features. These range
from traditional indicators, e.g. network density, number of
strong/weakly connected components and diameter, to more
elaborated ones such as main K-core number (Batagelj and
Zaversnik 2003) and structural virality (Goel et al. 2015).
We performed classification experiments with a simple
Logistic Regression model using two different datasets of
mainstream and disinformation news shared on Twitter re-
spectively in the United States and in Italy during 2019 (the
latter is part of the collection we release in this work).
We were able to classify credible vs non-credible arti-
cles with high accuracy (AUROC up to 94%), and we ob-
served that the layer of mentions alone conveys useful in-
formation for the classification, suggesting a different us-
age of mentions when sharing news belonging to the two
news domains. We also highlighted that most discrimina-
tive features, which are relative to the breadth and depth of
largest cascades in different layers, are the same across the
two countries. We refer the interested reader to (Pierri, Pic-
cardi, and Ceri 2020) for more details.
Conclusions
We released a large-scale dataset of tweets and articles con-
cerning disinformation and fact-checking stories circulating
on the Italian Twitterverse in 2019, and we provided a re-
lated descriptive statistics of sources, articles, tweets and
users. We also described two past applications of this dataset
which concern (1) the analysis of disinformation spreading
in Italy before 2019 European Parliament elections and (2)
an approach to detect disinformation based on Twitter diffu-
sion networks represented in a multi-layer flavor.
We hope that the research community might successfully
embody this data as to further investigate the issue of mali-
cious information outside the United States context, where
most of the research focus has been devoted in the past.
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